Abstract. Let n be a large composite number. Without factoring n, the computation of a 2 t (mod n) g i v en a, t with gcd(a n) = 1 and t < n can be done in t squarings modulo n. F or t n (e.g., n > 2 1024 and t < 2 100 ), no lower complexity than t squarings is known to ful ll this task. Rivest et al suggested to use such constructions as good candidates for realising timed-release crypto problems. We argue the necessity for a zero-knowledge proof of the correctness of such constructions and propose the rst practically e cient protocol for a realisation. Our protocol proves, in log 2 t standard crypto operations, the correctness of (a e ) 2 t (mod n) with respect to a e where e is an RSA encryption exponent. With such a proof, a Timed-release Encryption of a message M can be given as a 2 t M (mod n) with the assertion that the correct decryption of the RSA ciphertext M e (mod n) can be obtained by performing t squarings modulo n starting from a. Timed-release RSA signatures can be constructed analogously.
Introduction
Let n be a large composite natural number. Given t < n and gcd(a n) = 1, without factoring n, t h e v alidation of X a 2 t (mod n) (1) can be done in t squarings mod n. H o wever if (n) (Euler's phi function of n) is known, then the job can be completed in O(log n) multiplications via the following two steps:
X def = a u (mod n):
For t n (e.g., n > 2 1024 and t < 2 100 ), it can be anticipated that factoring of n (and hence computing (n) for performing the above steps) will be much more di cult than performing t squarings. Under this condition we do not know any other method which, without using the factorisation of n, can compute a 2 t (mod n) in time less than t squarings. Moreover, because each squaring can only be performed on the result of the previous squaring, it is not known how t o speedup the t squarings via parallelisation of multiple processors. Parallelisation of each squaring step cannot achieve a great deal of speedup since a squaring step only needs a trivial computational resource and so any non-trivial scale of parallelisation of a squaring step is likely to be penalised by communication delays among the processors.
These properties suggest that the following language (notice that each e l ement in the language associates a non-secret natural numbert) L(a n) = f a 2 t (mod n) j gcd(a n) = 1 t = 1 2 : : : g (4) forms a good candidate for the realisation of timed-release crypto problems. Rivest, Shamir and Wagner pioneered the use of this language in a time-lock puzzle scheme 11]. In their scheme a puzzle is a triple (t a n) and the instruction for nding its solution is to perform t squarings mod n starting from a which leads to a 2 t (mod n). A puzzle maker, with the factorisation knowledge of n, can construct a puzzle e ciently using the steps in (2) and (3) 
Applications
Boneh and Naor used a sub-language of L(a n) (details to be discussed in x1. 2) and constructed a timed-release crypto primitive w h i c h they called \timed commitments " 3] . Besides several suggested applications they suggested an interesting use of their primitive for solving a long-standing problem in fair contract signing. A previous solution (due to Damg ard 6]) for fair contract signing between two remote and mutually distrusted parties is to let them exchange signatures of a contract via gradual release of a secret. A major drawback with that solution is that it only provides a weak fairness. Let us describe this weakness by using, for example, a discrete-logarithm based signature scheme. A signature being gradually released relates to a series of discrete logarithm problems with the discrete logarithm values having gradually decreasing magnitudes. Sooner or later before the two parties completes their exchange, one of them may n d himself in a position of extracting a discrete logarithm which is su ciently small with respect to his computational resource. It is well-known (e.g., the work of van Oorschot and Wiener on the parallelised rho method 13]) that parallelisation is e ective for extracting small discrete logarithms. So the resourceful party (one who is able to a ord vast parallelisation) can abort the exchange at that point and wins an advanced position unfairly. Boneh and Naor suggested to seal signatures under exchange using elements in L(a n). Recall the aforementioned non-parallelisable property for re-constructing the elements in L(a n), a roughly equal time can be imposed for both parties to open the sealed signatures regardless of their di erence (maybe vast) in computing resources. In this way, t h e y argued that strong fairness for contract signing can be achieved.
Rivest et al suggested several other applications of timed-release cryptography 11]:
{ A bidder in an auction wants to seal his bid so that it can only be opened after the bidding period is closed.
{ A homeowner wants to give his mortgage holder a series of encrypted mortgage payments. These might be encrypted digital cash with di erent decryption dates, so that one payment becomes decryptable (and thus usable by the bank) at the beginning of each successive month.
{ A k ey-escrow s c heme can be based on timed-release crypto, so that the government can get the message keys, but only after a xed, pre-determined period.
{ An individual wants to encrypt his diaries so that they are only decryptable after fty y ears (when the individual may h a ve forgotten the decryption key).
Previous Work and Unsolved Problem
With the nice properties of L(a n) we are only half way to the realisation of timed-release cryptography. In most imaginable applications where timed-release crypto may play a role, it is necessary for a problem constructor to prove (ideally in zero-knowledge) the correct construction of the problem. For example, without a correctness proof, the strong fairness property of the fair-exchange application is actually absent.
From the problem's membership in NP we know that there exists a zeroknowledge proof for a membership assertion regarding language L(a n). Such a proof can be constructed via a general method (e.g., the work of Goldreich e t a l 9]). However, the performance of a zero-knowledge proof in a general construction is not suitable for practical use. By the performance for practical use we mean an e ciency measured by a small polynomial in some typical parameters (e.g., the bit length of n). To our knowledge, there exists no practically ecient zero-knowledge protocols for proving the general case of the membership in L(a n).
Boneh and Naor constructed a practically e cient protocol for proving membership in a sub-language of L(a n) where t = 2 k with k being any natural number. The time control that the elements in this sub-language can o er has the granularity 2 . W e know that the time complexity in bit operation for performing one squaring modulo n can be expressed by t h e l o west known result of c log n log log n (where c > 1 is a machine dependent v alue, a faster machine has a smaller c) if FFT (fast Fourier transform) is used for the implementation of squaring. Thus, the time complexity for computing elements in this sub-language is the step function 2 k c log n log log n which has a fast increasing step when k gets large. Boneh and Naor envisioned k 2 30 ::: 50] for typical cases in applications. While it is evident that k decreasing from 30 downwards will quickly trivialise a timed-release crypto problem as 2 30 is already at the level of a small polynomial in the secure bit length of n (usually 2 10 ), a k increasing from 30 upwards will harden the problem in such increasingly giant steps that imaginable services (e.g., the strong fairness for gradual disclosure of secret proposed in 3]) will quickly become unattractive o r unusable. Taking the LCS35 Time Capsule for example, let the 35-year-openingtime capsule be in that sub-language (so the correctness can be e ciently proved with the protocol in 3]), then the only other elements in that sub-language with opening times close to 35 years will be 17.5 years and 70 years. We should notice that there is no hope to try to tune the size of n as a means of tuning the time complexity since changing c log n log log n will have little impact on the above giant step function.
Boneh and Naor expressed a desire for a ner time-control ratio than 2 and sketched a method to obtain a ner ratio with t 0 = 1 a n d t i = t i;1 + t i;2 for i = 1 ::: k. This method of reducing the ratio renders the ratio being bounded below b y = 1+ p 5 2 ( 1:618) while increasing the number of proof rounds from k to log k. They further mentioned that smaller values can be obtained by o t h e r such recurrences. It seems to us that if some recurrence method similar to above is used, then with ratio ! 1 (1 is the ideal ratio and will be that for our case), the number of proof rounds log ratio k ! 1 . So their suggested methods for reducing the time-control ratio are not practical for obtaining a desirable ratio. The Time-Lock-Puzzle work of Rivest et al 11] did not provide a method for proving the correct construction of a timed-release crypto problem.
Our Work
We construct the rst practically e cient zero-knowledge proof protocol for demonstrating the membership in L(a n) which runs in log 2 t steps, each an exponentiation modulo n, o r O(log 2 t (log 2 n) 3 ) bit operations in total (without using FFT). This e ciency suits practical uses. The membership demonstration can be conducted in terms of (a e ) 2 t (mod n) 2 L(a e n ) on given a, a e and t, where e is an RSA encryption exponent. Then we are able to provide two timedrelease crypto primitives, one for timed release of a message, and the other for timed release of an RSA signature. In the former, a message M can be sealed in a 2 t M (mod n), and the established membership asserts that the correct decryption of the RSA ciphertext M e (mod n) can be obtained by performing t squarings modulo n starting from a. The latter primitive can be constructed analogously.
Our schemes provide general methods for the use of timed-release cryptography.
Organisation
In the next section we agree on the notation to be used in the paper. In Section 3 we construct general methods for timed-release cryptography based on proven membership in L(a n). In Section 4 we construct our membership proof protocol working with an RSA modulus of a safe-prime structure. In Section 5 we will discuss how to generalise our result to working with a general form of composite modulus.
Notation
Throughout the paper we use the following notation. Z n denotes the ring of integers modulo n. Z n denotes the multiplicative group of integers modulo n. (n) denotes Euler's phi function of n, w h i c h is the order, i.e., the number of elements, of the group Z n . F or an element a 2 Z n , o r d n (a) denotes the multiplicative o r d e r modulo n of a, which is the least index i satisfying a i 1 (mod n) hai denotes the subgroup generated by a ; x n denotes the Jacobi symbol of x mod n. We denote by J + (n) the subset of Z n containing the elements of the positive Jacobi symbol. For integers a, b, w e denote by gcd(a b) the greatest common divisor of a and b. F or a real numberr, w e d e n o t e b y brc the oor of r, i . e . , r rounded down to the nearest integer.
3 Timed-Release Crypto with Proven Membership in L(a n) Let Alice be the constructor of a timed-release crypto problem. She begins with constructing a composite natural numbern = pq where p and q are two distinct odd prime numbers. De ne a(t) def = a 2 t (mod n) (5) a e (t) def = (a(t)) e (mod n) (6) where e is a xed natural number relatively prime to (n) (in the position of an RSA public exponent), and a 6 1 (mod n) is a random element i n Z n . Alice can construct a(t) using the steps in (2) and (3).
The following security requirements should be in place: n should be so constructed that ord (n) (2) is su ciently large, and a should be so chosen that ord n (a) is su ciently large. Here, \su ciently large" means \much larger than t" for the largest possible t that the system should accommodate.
In the remainder of this section, we assume that Alice has proven to Bob, the veri er, the following membership status (using the protocol in x4): a e (t) 2 L(a e n ):
Clearly, with e co-prime to (n), this is equivalent to another membership status: a(t) 2 L(a n):
However in the latter case a(t) i s (temporarily) unavailable to Bob due to the di culty of extracting the e-th root (of a e (t)) in the RSA group.
Timed-release of an Encrypted Message
For message M < n, to make it decryptable in time t, Alice can construct a \timed encryption":
Let Bob be given the tuple (TE(M t) a e (t) e a t n ) where a e (t) is constructed in (5) and (6) and has the membership status in (7) proven by Alice. Then from the relation TE(M t) e a e (t)M e (mod n) (9) Bob is assured that the plaintext corresponding to the RSA ciphertext M e (mod n) can be obtained from TE(M t) b y performing t squarings modulo n starting from a. W e should note that in this encryption scheme, Alice is the sender and Bob, the recipient so if Alice wants the message to be timed-release to Bob exclusively then she should send a to Bob exclusively, e.g., via a con dential channel.
Remark 1. As in the case of any practical public-key encryption scheme, M in (8) should be randomised using a proper plaintext randomisation scheme designed for providing the semantic security (e.g., the OAEP scheme for RSA 7] ).
Timed-release of an RSA Signature
Let e, n be as above a n d d satisfy ed 1 ( m o d (n)) (so d is in the position of an RSA signing exponent). For message M < n (see Remark 2 below), to make its RSA signature M d (mod n) releasable in time t, Alice can construct a \timed signature":
Let Bob be given the tuple (M TS(M t) a e (t) e a t n ) where a e (t) i s c o nstructed in (5) and (6) and has the membership status in (7) proven by Alice. Then from the relation TS(M t) e a e (t)M (mod n) (11) Bob is assured that the RSA signature on M can be obtained from TS(M t) b y performing t squarings modulo n starting from a.
Remark 2. As in the case of a practical digital signature scheme, in order to prevent existential forgery of a signature, M in (10) should denote an output from a cryptographically secure one-way hash function. If we further require the signature to an indistinguishability property ( s e e x3.3), then the hashed result should be in J + (n). Padding M with a random string and then hashing, the probability for the hashed result in J + (n) i s 0 . 5 .
Security Analysis
Con dentiality of M in TE(M t ) We assume that Alice has implemented properly our security requirements on the large magnitudes of ord (n) (2) and ord n (a). Then we observe that L(a n) is a large subset of the quadratic residues modulo n, and the mapping a 7 ! a(t) is one-way under the appropriate intractability assumption (here, integer factorisation). Consequently, o u r s c heme for encrypting M 2 Z n in TE(M t) is a trapdoor one-way permutation since it is the multiplication, modulo n, of the message M to the trapdoor secret a(t).
In fact, from (9) we see that the availability o f TE(M t) e and a e (t) m a k es M e available, and so without considering to go through t squarings, the underlying intractability o f TE(M t) is reduced to that of RSA. Therefore, well-known plaintext randomisation schemes for RSA encryption (e.g., OAEP 7] ), which have been proposed for achieving the semantic security (against adaptive c hosen ciphertext attacks) can be applied to our plaintext message before the application of the permutation. The message con dentiality properties (i.e., the indistinguishability and non-malleability on the message M) of our timed-release encryption scheme should follow directly those of RSA-OAEP.
Thus, given the di culty of extracting the e-th root of a random element modulo n, a successful extraction of a(t) from a e (t), or of some information regarding M from TE(M t), will constitute a grand breakthrough in the area if they are done at a cost less than t squarings modulo n. Secondly, the randomness of a e (t) ensures that of TS(M t) e . T h us the availability o f t h e p a i r ( TS(M t) T S(M t) e ) does not constitute a valid signature of Alice on anything (such a s o n a n a d a p t i v ely chosen message). The availability of the pair (TS(M t) T S(M t) e ) is equivalent to that of (x x e ) which can be constructed by a n ybody using a random x.
Indistinguishability o f M d in TS(M t ) The indistinguishability i s t h e f o llowing property: with the timed-release signature TS(M t) o n M and with the proven membership a e (t) 2 L(a e n ) but without going through t squarings mod n, one should not be able to tell whether TS(M t) h a s a n y veri able relationship with a signature on M. This property should hold even if the signature pair (M M d ) becomes available namely, even if Bob has recovered the signature pair (M M d ) (e.g., after having performed t squarings), he is still not able to convince a third party t h a t TS(M t) is a timed-release signature of Alice on M. This property i s s h o wn below.
LetM 2 J + (n) b e a n y message of Bob's choice (e.g., Bob may h a ve c hosen it becauseM d may b e a vailable to him from a di erent c o n text). We h a ve
So upon seeing Bob's allegation on a \veri able relationship" between TS(M t) and M d , the third party faces a problem of deciding which o f M d orM d is sealed in TS(M t). This boils down to deciding if a(t) 2 L(a n) o r i f a 2 L(a n) ( b o t h are in J + (n)), which is still a problem of going through t squarings. Thus, even though the availability o f M d andM d does allow one to recognise that the both are in fact Alice's valid signatures, without verifying the membership status, one is unable to tell if any of the two h a s a n y connection with TS(M t) a t a l l .
Membership Proof with Modulus of a Safe-Prime Structure
Let Alice have constructed her RSA modulus n with a safe-prime structure.
This requires n = pq, p 0 = ( p ; 1)=2, q 0 = ( q ; 1)=2 where p, q, p 0 and q 0 are all distinct primes of roughly equal size. We assume that Alice has proven to Bob in zero-knowledge such a structure of n. This can be achieved via using, e.g., the protocol of Camenisch and Michels 4]. 1 Let a 2 Z n satisfy gcd(a 1 n ) = 1 (12) a n = ;1:
It is elementary to show that a satisfying (12) and (13) has the full order 2p 0 q 0 .
The following lemma observes a property o f a. Lemma 1. Let n be an RSA modulus of a safe-prime structure a n d a 2 Z n of the full order. Then for any x 2 Z n , either x 2 h ai or ;x 2 h ai. Proof It's easy to check ;1 6 2 hai. S o hai and the coset (;1)hai both have t h e half the size of Z n , yielding Z n = hai (;1)hai. A n y x 2 Z n is either in hai or in (;1)hai. The latter case means ;x 2 h ai. u t 1 Due to the current di culty of zero-knowledge proof for a safe-prime-structured RSA modulus, we recommend to use the method in Section 5 which w orks with a general form of composite modulus. The role of Section 4 is to serve a clear exposition on how w e solve the current problem in timed-release cryptography.
A Building Block Protocol
Let Alice and Bob have agreed on n (this is based on Bob's satisfaction on Alice's proof that n has a safe-prime structure). Figure 1 speci es a perfect zero-knowledge protocol (S Q ) for Alice to prove that for a x y 2 Z n with n of a safe-prime structure, a of the full order, and x y 2 J + (n), they satisfy (note, below means either + or ;, but not both)
9z : x a z (mod n) y a z 2 (mod n):
Alice should of course have constructed a x y to satisfy (14). She sends a x y to Bob.
Bob (has checked n of a safe-prime structure) should rst check (12) and (13) on a for its full-order property (the check guarantees a 6 1 (mod n)) he should also check x y 2 J + (n).
SQ(a x y n) Input Common: n: an RSA modulus with a safe-prime structure a 2 Z n : an element of the full-order 2p 0 q 0 = (n)=2 (so a 6 1 ( m o d n)) x y 2 J+(n): x 6 y (mod n) Alice: z: x a z (mod n), y a z 2 (mod n)
1. Bob chooses at random r < n , s < n and sends to Alice: C def = a r x s (mod n) 2. Alice sends to Bob: R (14) does not hold for the common input (a x y n) (here x y 2 J + (n)) whereas Bob has accepted Alice's proof. By Lemma 1, the rst congruence of (14) always holds for some z = l o g a x. So it is the second congruence of (14) that does not hold for the same z. L e t 2 Z n satisfy y a z 2 (mod n) with 6 = 1: (15) Since Bob accepts the proof, he sees the following two congruences C a r x s (mod n) (16) R x r y s (mod n):
(17) Since (16) implies C 2 a 2r x 2s (mod n) and by Lemma 1, both log a C 2 and log a x 2 (= log a ( x) 2 = 2 z) exist, we can write the following linear congruence with r and s as unknowns log a C 2 2r + 2 zs(mod 2p 0 q 0 ): For s = 1 2 2p 0 q 0 , this linear congruence yields r = log a C 2 ;2zs 2 (mod 2p 0 q 0 ). Therefore there exists exactly 2p 0 q 0 pairs of (r s ) to satisfy (16) for any xed C (and the xed a x). Each of these pairs and the xed x, y will yield an R from (17). Below w e argue that for any t wo s u c h pairs, denoted by ( r s ) a n d ( r 0 s 0 ), if gcd(s ; s 0 2p 0 q 0 ) 2 then they must yield R 6 R 0 (mod n). Suppose The safe-prime structure of n implies p 0 q 0 p n and hence this probability v alue is approximately 2= p n. 
Recall that 6 = 1 a n d y a z 2 x z (mod n) with x y 2 J + (n), we k n o w ord n ( ) 6 = 2 (i.e., cannot be any square root of 1, since the two roots 6 = 1 will render y 6 2 J + (n)). Thus, ord n ( ) must be a multiple of p 0 or q 0 or both. However, we h a ve assumed gcd(s 0 ; s 2p 0 q 0 ) 2, i.e., gcd (2(s 0 ; s) In (21) we see that the exponent 2 t can be expressed as the square of another power of 2 with t being halved in the latter. This observation suggests that repeatedly using S Q , w e can demonstrate, in blog 2 tc steps, that the discrete logarithm of an element is of the form 2 t . This observation translates precisely into the protocol speci ed in Figure 2 which will terminate within blog 2 tc steps and prove the correct structure of a(t). The protocol is presented in three columns: the actions in the left column are performed by Alice, those in the right column, by Bob, and those in the middle, by the both parties.
A run of Membership(a t a(t) n ) will terminate within blog 2 tc loops, and this is the completeness property. The zero-knowledge property follows that of S Q(also note Remark 4(ii) below). We only have t o s h o w the soundness property. Theorem 2. Let n = (2p 0 + 1)(2q 0 + 1 ) be an RSA modulus of a safe-prime structure, a 2 Z n be of the full order 2p 0 q 0 , and t > 1. Upon acceptance termination of Membership(a t a(t) n ), r elation a(t) a 2 t (mod n) holds with Proof Denote by S Q (a x 1 y 1 n ) a n d b y S Q (a x 2 y 2 n ) a n y t wo consecutive acceptance calls of S Qin Membership (so in the rst call, y 1 = a(t) i f t is even, or y 1 = a(t ; 1) if t is odd and in the last call, x 2 = a 2 ). When t > 1, such t wo calls prove that there exists z:
x 2 a z (mod n) y 2 a z 2 (mod n)
and either x 1 = y 2 a z 2 (mod n) y 1 a z 4 (mod n) (23) or x 1 = y 2 2 a 2z 2 (mod n) y 1 a 4z 4 (mod n):
Upon t = 1, Bob further sees that x 2 = a 2 . By induction, the exponents z (resp. z 2 , z 4 , 2 z 2 , 4 z 4 ) in all cases of a z (resp. a z 2 , ) in (22), (23) i) An acceptance run of Membership(a t a(t) n ) proves a(t) 2 L(a n), or a 2 (t) = a(t + 1 ) 2 L(a n).
ii) It is obvious that by preparing all the intermediate values in advance, Protocol Membership can be run in parallel to save the blog 2 tc rounds of in-
teractions. This way of parallelisation should not be confused with another common method for parallelising a proof of knowledge protocol using a hash function to create challenge bits (which turns the proof publicly veri able). Our parallelisation does not damage the zero-knowledge property.
iii) In most applications, a(t) is the very number (solution to a puzzle) that
should not be disclosed to Bob during the proof time. In such a situation, Alice should choose t to be even and render a(t ; 1) to be the solution to a puzzle. Then a proof of Membership(a t a(t) n ) will not disclose a(t ; 1) .
Note that such a proof does disclose to Bob a(bt=2c) which provides Bob with a complexity o f bt=2c ; 1 squarings to reach a(t ; 1). To compensate the loss of computation, proof of Membership(a 2t a(2t) n ) is necessary. Consequently, the proof runs one loop more than Membership(a t a(t) n ) does. Note that the above precautions are unnecessary for our applications in x3 where it is the e-th root of a e (t) that is the puzzle's solution the disclosures of a e (t) o r a e (bt=2c) do not seem to reduce the time complexity for nding a(t).
Performance
In each r u n o f S Q , Alice (resp. Bob) performs one (resp. four) exponentiation(s) mod n. So in Membership(a t a(t) n ) Alice (resp. Bob) will perform blog 2 tc (resp. 4blog 2 tc) exponentiations mod n. These translate to O(blog 2 tc(log 2 n) 3 ) bit operations.
In the LCS35 Time Capsule Crypto-Puzzle 10], t = 79685186856218 is a 47-bit binary number. Thus the veri cation for that puzzle can be completed within 4 47 = 188 exponentiations mod n.
The numb e r o f b i t s t o b e e x c hanged is measured by O((blog 2 tc)(log 2 n)).
Use of Modulus of a General Form
When n does not have a safe-prime structure, the error probability o f S Qcan
bemuch larger than what we h a ve measured in Theorem 1. The general method for Alice to introduce an error in her proof (i.e., to cheat) is to x y in (15) with some 6 = 1. For y so xed before Bob's challenge C, Bob is actually awaiting for R C z s (mod n) in which s (mod n) is the only value that Alice does not know (she does not know it because Bob's random choice of s is perfectly hidden in C). Therefore in order to respond with the correct R, i t is both necessary and su cient for Alice to guess s (mod n) correctly. Notice that while it is unnecessary and can be too di cult for Alice to guess s, guessing s (mod n) need not be very di cult and the probability o f a correct guess is bounded by 1 ordn( ) . T h us, in order for Alice to achieve a large error probability (meaning, to ease her cheating), she should use of a small order.
The above c heating scenario provides the easiest method for Alice to cheat and yet is general enough for covering the cases that the soundness of S Qshould consider. Multiplying both x and y with some small-order elements will only make the cheating job more di cult. Therefore it su ces for us to anticipate the above general cheating method. To this end it becomes apparent that in order to limit Alice's cheating probability w e should prevent her from constructing y in (15) using of a small order. Using a safe-prime-structured modulus n = ( 2 p 0 + 1)(2q 0 + 1 ) a c hieves this purpose exactly because then the least order available to Alice is min( 1 p 0 1 q 0 ) w h i c h is satis ably small (using of order 2 either does not constitute an attack, or will cause detection of y 6 2 J + (n)).
While a zero-knowledge proof of n being in a safe-prime structure is computationally ine cient to date, it is rather easy to construct a zero-knowledge proof protocol for proving that (n) is free of small odd prime factors up to a bound B. B o yar et al 2] constructed a practically e cient zero-knowledge proof protocol for proving that (n) is relatively prime to n. As in 8], we can apply the same idea to prove that (n) is relatively prime to (i.e., using in place of n) where = Y primes`: 2 < < B : (25) Supposing that n i s a B l u m integer (which c a n b e e ciently proved using, e.g., the protocol of van de Graaf and Peralta 12]), then after applying the protocol of Boyar et al using in (25) in place of n, we can be sure that the error probability o f S Qis bounded by B ;1 . Notice that the multiplication attack using the square roots of 1 with the negative J a c o b i s y m bol (in place of in (15)) is not possible since that will be detected by the Jacobi symbolchecking conducted on the input values. Thus, if Alice is required to repeat running S Q k log 2 B times, then Bob is sure that her cheating probability (i.e., for (14) not to hold) is bounded by 2 ;k .
Performance of Membership Proof Using General Form of Modulus
With the soundness probability o f S Qbounded by B ;1 , for each case of x y, S Q (a x y n) need to be run k log 2 B times to achieve an acceptable soundness probability 2 ;k . T h us in Membership, S Qis run blog 2 tck log 2 B times. Since in each run of S Q , Alice (resp. Bob) performs one (resp. four) exponentiation(s) mod n. S o i n Membership(a t a(t) n ) Alice (resp. Bob) will perform blog 2 tck log 2 B (resp. Zero-knowledge proof of a Blum integer using the protocol in 12] has a performance similar to one modulo exponentiation for Alice the workload of that protocol for Bob is trivial since it only involves multiplications and evaluations of Jacobi symbols. Thus, considering the same low soundness probability o f 2 ;100 , we should add 100 modulo exponentiations to Alice's workload to reach 670 modulo exponentiations.
Conclusion
We h a ve constructed an e cient zero-knowledge protocol for providing general solutions to timed-release cryptographic problems (encryption and signature). These schemes have p r o ven correctness on time control which can be ne tuned to the granularity i n n umberofmultiplications.
Successful timed-release cryptographic problems have been constructed upon the integer-factoring based intractability. An important feature that such intractability o ers is non-parallelisability. An open question is that can other intractability o er this feature? (We k n o w that the problem of extraction of discrete logarithm can be parallelised 13].)
